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1Integrated Retail and Wholesale Power System
Operation with Smart-Grid Functionality
Dionysios Aliprantis, Senior Member, IEEE,, Scott Penick, Student Member, IEEE,,
Leigh Tesfatsion, Member, IEEE, and Huan Zhao
Abstract—Our research team is developing an agent-based
test bed for the integrated study of retail and wholesale power
markets operating over transmission and distribution networks
with smart-grid functionality. This test bed seams together two
existing test beds, the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test
Bed and the GridLAB-D distribution platform. As a first step,
we have designed an integrated retail/wholesale market module
specifically based on the ERCOT (Texas) energy region, and we
are using simplified versions of this module to study potential
retail consumer response to real-time-pricing contracts supported
by advanced metering. This study reports on the latter work.
Index Terms—Restructured power markets, smart grid, retail
competition, real-time pricing, demand response, agent-based test
bed
I. INTRODUCTION
RETAIL and wholesale power market operations are in-trinsically interdependent. Moreover, these market opera-
tions are constrained by transmission and distribution networks
supporting underlying power flows. Power systems thus entail
complicated dynamic couplings of market and physical system
operations [1].
The main goal of the project reported in this study is to de-
velop an agent-based test bed that permits the comprehensive
study of power systems from both economic and engineering
points of view. Our particular focus is the integrated study of
retail and wholesale power markets operating over transmis-
sion and distribution grids with “smart-grid functionality.”
By smart-grid functionality we mean service-oriented grid
enhancements permitting more responsiveness to retail cus-
tomer needs and preferences. An example of such an enhance-
ment would be the installation of residential meters that can be
read automatically and that support two-way communication
between retail consumers and their suppliers, thus permitting
a flexible array of contracts ranging from flat-rate to real-time
pricing.
The specific context for the wholesale power market portion
of our test bed is the design recommended in a 2003 White
Paper [2] by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) for common adoption by North American wholesale
power markets, referred to below as the Wholesale Power
Market Platform (WPMP). As depicted in Fig. 1, versions of
the WPMP design have been implemented (or adopted for
implementation) in energy regions encompassing over 50%
of U.S. generating capacity. These energy regions include
the Midwest (MISO), New England (ISONE), New York
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Fig. 1. North American energy regions that have adopted FERC’s whole-
sale power market design. Source: www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-
act/rto/rto-map.asp
(NYISO), the Mid-Atlantic States (PJM), California (CAISO),
the Southwest (SPP), and Texas (ERCOT).
The core design element of the WPMP is a two-settlement
system to be managed by an Independent System Operator
(ISO) or Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Roughly,
a two-settlement system refers to the combined workings of
a day-ahead energy market and a real-time energy market
that are separately settled each day by means of Locational
Marginal Pricing (LMP). Under LMP, a separate price for
power is determined at each point of the transmission grid at
which power is injected or withdrawn.
As envisioned in the WPMP, and implemented in practice,
the wholesale day-ahead market is structured as a double
auction. Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) are permitted to submit
hourly demand bids consisting of both fixed and price-sensitive
hourly demands, and Generation Companies (GenCos) are
permitted to submit hourly supply offers consisting of price-
sensitive hourly supplies.
In actuality, however, the day-ahead market effectively
functions as a single-sided seller auction because the bulk of
the demand takes the form of fixed hourly loads (i.e., load
profiles) implying essentially vertical hourly demand curves.
As elaborated in [3], a key difficulty is that downstream retail
power markets in the U.S. are still largely regulated with cost-
based pricing, so that LSEs in fact have little incentive to
submit price-sensitive demand bids.
Even in states that have nominally introduced retail compe-
tition, the use of extended default service contracts and long-
term wholesale procurement contracts reduces market entry
and contributes to the persistence of vertical demand curves
2in wholesale day-ahead markets. As experimentally shown in
[4], under this scenario energy sellers are easily able to learn to
implicitly collude on reported supply offers involving higher-
than-true marginal costs that result in much higher market
operating costs.
These adverse market performance characteristics suggest
the need for an integrated restructuring of both retail and
wholesale power markets. Rather than use actual systems as
test beds, however, we are developing an agent-based test bed
that seams together two previously developed agent-based test
beds:
• AMES [5], an open-source software platform developed
by a team of researchers at Iowa State University for
the study of strategic trading in ISO-operated restructured
wholesale power markets with congestion managed by
LMP.
• GridLAB-D [6], an open-source software platform de-
veloped by the U.S. Department of Energy at Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for the study of
power distribution systems for end-use customers with
power loads arising from a variety of modeled appliances
and equipment.
The resulting seamed test bed will permit us to pre-test,
through intensive systematic experimentation, how an inte-
grated restructuring of retail and wholesale power markets
might best be implemented. Of particular interest will be the
systematic experimental exploration of recent “smart grid”
proposals for improving supply adequacy and the efficiency
of overall power system operations, where “efficiency” refers
to the non-wastage of current and future resources.
Specifically, four closely-related research topics will be
pursued under this project by means of systematic experiments
conducted within this seamed test bed, in combination with an-
alytical and empirical studies. Refs. [7]–[12] provide important
background materials for these topics.
The first research topic concerns the potential effectiveness
of bottom-up demand response (DR) initiatives. What are the
potential impacts of increased price-responsiveness of demand
(e.g., through advanced metering infrastructure or demand
response programs) on supply adequacy and the efficiency of
market operations? In particular, what are the most appropriate
designs for pricing contracts and financial risk-management
tools under alternative mixtures of real-time and flat-rate
pricing?
The second research topic will focus on distributed energy
resources (DER), including both distributed generation and
distributed storage facilities. What are the desirable types,
sizes, and sitings of DER from a social efficiency viewpoint?
Examples of possible consumer-owned DER are depicted in
Fig. 2.
The third research topic will focus on grid architecture
issues. Will proposed restructurings of the distribution and/or
transmission networks to incorporate microgrid1 and other
transformations of grid architecture help to improve both sup-
ply adequacy and system efficiency? Could market operations
1By a microgrid we mean an integrated electrical energy system composed
of interconnected energy sinks and sources that can operate in parallel with
the distribution grid or in an intentional island mode.
Fig. 2. Consumer-owned distributed energy resource possibilities.
be used to control local grids in “islanded” mode (under
grid contingencies) with increased penetration of distributed
generation? How can the market “sense” a disturbance (i.e.,
blackout), and re-dispatch itself to supply critical local load
based on available generation?
The fourth research topic will focus on smart-grid devices
and “agent intelligence.” What kind of software should be
preferably embedded in a smart device? How much compu-
tational complexity is required for implementation, and how
does it affect cost? What learning algorithm(s) should the
agents use? Do some algorithms outperform others, and in
what ways? Which ones benefit the users more?
This study reports project work to date. Section II reports on
the preliminary development of an integrated retail/wholesale
power market model based on Texas (ERCOT). Section III
presents preliminary research on retail contracting issues using
simple analytical models based on this market module. Test
bed seaming issues are addressed in Section IV. The final
Section V provides concluding remarks.
II. CASE STUDY: ERCOT
As an important initial step towards the development of our
seamed AMES/GridLAB-D test bed, we are developing an
empirically-grounded integrated retail/wholesale market model
specifically based on the market structure implemented by the
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).
We have chosen ERCOT as our initial empirical benchmark
because ERCOT appears to have moved further than any
other U.S. energy region towards the integrated restructuring
of its retail and wholesale power market operations [11].
ERCOT is currently in the process of implementing a two-
settlement wholesale power market system (separate real-time
and day-ahead market settlements) with transmission grid
congestion managed by LMP. Moreover, ERCOT is vigorously
pursuing implementation of smart-grid initiatives such as smart
metering. For example, in December 2009 ERCOT launched a
new system of wholesale settlement for its advanced metered
customers based on their 15-minute electric energy usage [13].
A. Modeling the ERCOT Distribution System
Of all the issues involved in modeling a distribution system
for the study of the implementation of smart-grid technology,
3Fig. 3. Integrated retail and wholesale market structure in ERCOT
finding accurate non-proprietary data for distribution systems
is one of the most difficult. Ref. [14] reports compiled data
from distribution systems throughout the nation. To compen-
sate for lack of data, the authors propose a statistical method
for modeling the distribution systems within a region that are
representative of the real system.
Although ERCOT is relatively small compared with the
other six restructured U.S. energy regions, it nevertheless spans
a large area of land. In particular, ERCOT has significantly
different climate regions, which in turn affects retail demand
conditions. Consequently, the distribution system modeling
method proposed in [14] could potentially be useful for our
project.
B. Modeling Retail Competition in ERCOT
One important theme of electricity market reform in ER-
COT has been the divestment of traditional utility operations.
Specifically, Chapter 25 of the Public Utility Commission of
Texas (PUCT) now requires that each electric utility shall
separate its business activities and related costs into separate
units handling generation, transmission, and distribution [15].
The result has been that retail competition in ERCOT is
now realized through the separation of physical power flows
from the financial contracting for power purchases and sales.
As depicted in Fig. 3, power flow operations are managed
by Transmission and/or Distribution Utilities (TDUs) whereas
financial contracts are provided by LSEs.
More precisely, the LSEs purchase bulk power from the
wholesale market and resell it to retail customers through
various financial contracts. Typically, LSEs are not responsible
for infrastructure construction and maintenance. Rather, they
compete for retail customers. Customers can switch financial
contracts or LSEs without power usage interference.
Fig. 4 depicts the key entities involved in ERCOT electric
energy retail operation in greater detail. LSEs represent either
Fig. 4. Principal organizations in ERCOT involved in electric energy retail
operations. Source: http://www.ercot.com/services/rq/lse/
Competitive Retailers (CRs) or Non Opt-In Entities (NOIEs).
CRs are the only organizations authorized to sell electric
energy to retail customers who have customer choice. NOIEs
are electric cooperatives and municipally owned utilities that
do not operate as CRs and do not plan to offer customer
choice.
The CRs in ERCOT are further subdivided into Retail
Electric Providers (REPs) and Opt-In Entities (OIEs). A REP
is an organization that contracts with qualified scheduling
entities to provide scheduling services for their load customers.
An opt-in entity is a municipally owned utility or co-operative
that opts to offer customer choice.
Entry barriers for REPs in ERCOT are quite low. As re-
ported in [16], by June 2008, 85 REPs were providing electric
energy services to customers. These REPs were offering as
many as 96 different products in various territories, including
13 REPs which were offering, between them, 23 different
renewable energy options.
Electric service switching can be done smoothly with this
business separation structure. CRs interact directly with ER-
COT when submitting switching requests, where customers
choose a new CR. ERCOT processes the switching requests by
working with TDUs to obtain the initial and final meter reads,
confirming switches with customers, and confirming the switch
with the relevant CRs once the switch is approved. The rules
for REP operation are evolving to deal with the ripple effects
of REP bankruptcies. For example, ERCOT is currently in the
process of finalizing its REP rules on disclosure and billing
terms.
Various types of customer service contracts flourish in
ERCOT’s retail market. Indeed, ERCOT provides over 96
different types of contracts for its retail customers. These
contracts are primarily differentiated in terms of the type of
rate structure that is offered to meet different customer needs.
For example, customers can choose among fixed-price (FP)
contracts, time-of-use (TOU) contracts, and real-time-price
(RTP) contracts.
Many retail customers in ERCOT have been prevented from
taking advantage of RTP contracts due to lack of advanced
meters, but this situation is changing. Indeed, ERCOT’s recent
major efforts to promote the spread and use of advance
metering [13] could eventually support not only increased
4RTP contracting for wholesale power but also contracts for
the reverse sale of power from consumer-owned distributed
energy resources back to the grid; see Fig. 2.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYTICAL FINDINGS
The restructuring of retail markets in ERCOT has primarily
focused on the introduction of retail competition and RTP
contracts. Ideally, retail competition should efficiently trans-
fer price signals from wholesale markets to retail markets,
while RTP should provide retail customers the opportunity
to respond to fluctuating prices, thus increasing the price-
elasticity of their electric energy demands. These two aspects
of retail market restructuring are interconnected. Competition
should enhance the implementation of RTP contracts, while
RTP should provide more choices to the customer, making
competition more meaningful.
Our initial studies (under the first research topic) are focused
on how to use appropriate smart-grid technology to support
retail competition and RTP deployment. These studies are
empirically grounded in the real situation in ERCOT, which
is in the forefront of retail competition.
The particular issue we consider is the effectiveness of
electric energy contract choice from the point of view of the
retail consumer. For example, Borenstein and Holland [17]
point out that implementing RTP may not be cost-effective
in light of the incremental billing and sophisticated metering
costs. Also, the study of Faruqui and George [18] suggests
that small customers are reluctant to shift energy usage in
response to price signals. Using these and other related studies
as basic background materials, we plan to explore the extent to
which consumers would benefit from the availability of RTP
contracts. We are also concerned with obtaining better esti-
mates of the price elasticity of consumer demands for electric
energy under different contract availability conditions, making
use of detailed empirical data regarding energy requirements
of electric appliances and typical weather conditions.
In the following subsections we present findings for a
simple analytical model to shed some light on electric en-
ergy contract choice from the perspective of the retail con-
sumer. We consider a short-run problem in which a budget-
constrained utility-maximizing consumer chooses how much
electric energy to consumer in two different periods, on-peak
and off-peak, conditional on the terms of his existing electric
energy contract. We then show that, under competitive retail
conditions, the consumer will always be at least as well off
under an RTP contract as under an FP contract, strictly so if
wholesale prices differ across the two periods.
A. Electric Energy Contract Choice Model: Basic Set-Up
Consider a consumer on a particular day D who has the
ability to shift his electric energy consumption between two
different periods each day, on-peak and off-peak. Let b denote
the consumer’s choice of electric energy consumption for the
on-peak period, and let b′ denote the consumer’s choice of
electric energy consumption for the off-peak period. Also, let a
denote the consumer’s choice of consumption for a composite
good other than electric energy. Hereafter it will be assumed
that the composite good a is a numeraire good in terms of
which all other prices are evaluated, so that the price of the
composite good itself is fixed at 1.
Suppose the consumer evaluates the utility of his electric
energy consumption on day D by means of the following log-
linear utility function:
U(b, b′, a) = a + α ln b + β ln b′ , (1)
where α > β > 0. The latter assumption implies that the on-
peak period is the more preferred consumption period in the
following sense: starting from a common level of electric en-
ergy consumption in each period, the consumer could increase
his utility by switching some amount of consumption from the
off-peak to the on-peak period.
Suppose, also, that the consumer has available an income m
for expenditures on day D, where m is measured in terms of
the numeraire good a. His objective for day D is to maximize
U(b, b′, a) with respect to selection of b, b′, and a subject to
the budget constraint
a + po · b + pf · b′ = m , (2)
where po denotes the price paid by the consumer for on-peak
electric energy and pf denotes the price paid by the consumer
for off-peak electric energy.
Solving the consumer’s budget-constrained utility maxi-
mization problem, the consumer’s optimal solution values
for electric energy consumption during on-peak and off-peak








Plugging these solution values into the budget constraint (2)
gives the consumer’s optimal solution value
a∗ = (m− α− β) (4)
for consumption of the composite good a.
For later purposes, it is important to keep in mind that the
electric energy prices po and pf in (3) denote the electric
energy prices that are charged to the retail consumer for
electric energy consumption in the on-peak and off-peak
periods. These prices might differ from the actual wholesale
prices for electric energy in the on-peak and off-peak periods.
Hereafter the actual wholesale prices for electric energy in
the on-peak and off-peak periods will be denoted by p and p′,
respectively. Note that any LSE contracting with the consumer
for delivery of electric energy in the on-peak and off-peak
periods must pay these actual wholesale prices, regardless of
the prices it charges to the consumer.
B. Contract Prices and Consumer Welfare
We now need to consider the possible price configurations
and the welfare of the consumer under different forms of
electric energy contracts. For an FP contract, the price of
electric energy is fixed at some level p regardless whether
usage occurs in the on-peak or off-peak periods: po = pf = p.
In contrast, under a RTP contract the price of electric energy
5in each usage period is set at the level of the actual wholesale
electric energy price: po = p and pf = p′.2
If the price for a good increases relative to the prices
of other goods, a budget-constrained consumer will benefit
(gain more utility) if he substitutes consumption of the lower-
priced goods for consumption of the higher-priced good.
Consequently, in the present example, an RTP contract should
induce the consumer to shift his consumption towards the
period with the lowest electric energy price, all else equal.
The question still arises, however, whether the consumer is
better off under an RTP contract than under an FP contract
under all circumstances.
Making use of these solution values (3) and (4), the utility
levels attained by the consumer conditional on either an RTP or
an FP electric energy contract, given arbitrary positive values
for the RTP contract prices (p, p′) and the FTP contract price
p¯, are as follows:
URTP = (m− α− β) + α · ln α
p
+ β · ln β
p′
; (5)
UFP = (m− α− β) + α · ln α
p
+ β · ln β
p
. (6)
Consider, now, the possible settings for the FP contract
price p in relation to the utility of the consumer. Suppose
that an LSE only provides an FP contract to the consumer at
a fixed price p if this fixed price is high enough to ensure the
LSE covers its electric energy purchase costs in the wholesale
market. The following restriction on p ensures that the LSE
just “breaks even” in terms of covering its purchase costs,
hence it determines the minimum fixed price that the LSE
would be willing to set for its FP contract:
p =
[p · b∗(p) + p′ · b′∗(p)]
[b∗(p) + b′∗(p)]
. (7)
Assume that a large number of LSEs are competing for retail
consumers in the particular region including the consumer at
hand, so that the LSEs are all paying the same wholesale prices
for servicing these consumers. Suppose that the fixed prices
offered by these LSEs in their FP contracts are then driven
down by competition to the level p satisfying (7).
Substituting into (7) the consumer’s optimal electric energy
consumption levels b∗(p) = α/p and b′∗(p) = β/p under an
FP contract with a fixed price p, as determined from (3), one
can solve for the competitive fixed price as follows:
pc =
α · p + β · p′
α + β
. (8)
Substituting the competitive fixed price (8) into the utility
level (6) attained by the consumer under an FP contract, and
comparing the results against the utility level (5) attained by
the consumer under an RTP contract, the result is:
URTP = (m− α− β) + α lnα + β lnβ
−α ln p− β ln p′ ; (9)
2In reality, a mark-up would presumably be included to cover servicing
costs and provide a “normal” rate of profit for the LSE. These complications
are not relevant for the points to be made in this section and so are omitted
here for simplicity.
UFP = (m− α− β) + α lnα + β lnβ
−(α + β) · ln(α·p+β·p′α+β ) . (10)
Using Jensen’s inequality,3 it is seen that that URTP ≥
UFP, and URTP > UFP when p = p′. Consequently, the
utility attained by the consumer is at least as high under the
RTP contract as under the FP contract, and strictly higher if
the wholesale prices for on-peak and off-peak electric energy
differ.
Note that the total electric energy amounts consumed under
the two contract types are ambiguous. Moreover, it follows
from the form of the consumer’s budget constraint (2) and
the consumer’s optimal electric energy consumption solution
(3) that the total expenditure on electric energy under each
type of contract is the same: namely, α + β. These findings
are consistent with the findings in the U.S. Department of
Energy’s Pacific Northwest Testbed Demonstration on the
Olympic Peninsula [7].
In some commentaries on retail restructuring, the benefits of
restructuring are motivated in terms of lower electric energy
usage or expenditures. Overall energy savings might be an
appropriate concern from a social welfare point of view.
However, from the point of view of individual consumers, the
appropriate measure of welfare is their attained utility levels,
since this is what will incentivize their behavior.
IV. TEST BED SEAMING ISSUES
We plan to investigate the interaction of retail and wholesale
market by seaming AMES [5] with GridLAB-D [6]. A short
introduction to the two test beds and the intended seaming
work are outlined in this section.
A. The AMES Test Bed
As detailed in [19], AMES(V2.05) is an open-source Java
package that simulates the operations of an ISO-administered
wholesale power market with grid congestion managed by
LMP. The AMES wholesale power market operates over an
AC transmission grid starting with hour H00 of day 1 and
continuing through hour H23 of a user-specified maximum
day. AMES includes an ISO together with a collection of LSEs
and GenCos distributed across the buses of the transmission
grid.
The objective of the not-for-profit ISO is the maximization
of Total Net Surplus (TNS)4 subject to transmission constraints
and GenCo operating capacity limits. In an attempt to attain
this objective, the ISO operates a day-ahead energy market
settled by means of LMP.
The welfare of each LSE j is measured by the net earnings
it secures each day through the purchase of power in the day-
ahead market and the resale of this power to retail customers.
3Jensen’s inequality in the form needed here is as follows. For any concave
function φ(x) defined over the real line, real numbers x1, . . . , xn, and









4As explained more carefully in [20], TNS is the area between the aggregate
demand curve derived from LSE demand bids and the aggregate supply curve
derived from GenCo supply offers. When all demand bids are price inelastic,
the TNS-maximization objective of the ISO reduces to the minimization of
GenCo operational costs.
6During the morning of each day D, each LSE j reports a
demand bid to the ISO for the day-ahead market for day
D + 1. Each demand bid consists of two parts: fixed demand
(i.e., a 24-hour load profile) that can be sold downstream at
a regulated rate r to retail customers with flat-rate pricing
contracts; and 24 price-sensitive inverse demand functions
(one for each hour) reflecting price-sensitive demand by retail
customers with real-time pricing contracts.5
The objective of each GenCo i is to secure for itself
the highest possible net earnings each day through the sale
of power in the day-ahead market. During the morning of
each day D, each GenCo i uses its current action choice
probabilities to choose a supply offer from its action domain
ADi to report to the ISO for use in all 24 hours of the day-
ahead market for day D + 1. This supply offer consists of
a marginal cost function defined over an operating capacity
interval. GenCo i’s ability to vary its choice of a supply
offer from ADi permits it to adjust its reported marginal cost
function and/or its reported operating capacity interval in an
attempt to increase its daily net earnings.
After receiving demand bids from LSEs and supply offers
from GenCos during the morning of day D, the ISO deter-
mines and publicly posts hourly LMP and dispatch levels for
the day-ahead market for day D + 1. These hourly outcomes
are determined via hourly Security-Constrained Economic
Dispatch (SCED) formulated as hourly bid/offer-based DC op-
timal power flow (OPF) problems. Grid congestion is managed
by the inclusion of congestion cost components in LMPs. At
the end of each day D the ISO settles the day-ahead market
for day D + 1 by receiving all purchase payments from LSEs
and making all sale payments to GenCos based on the LMPs
for the day-ahead market for day D + 1.
Each GenCo i at the end of each day D uses stochastic
reinforcement learning6 to update the action choice proba-
bilities currently assigned to the supply offers in its action
domain ADi, taking into account its day-D settlement payment
(“reward”). In particular, if GenCo i’s supply offer on day
D results in a relatively good reward, GenCo i increases the
probability it will choose to report this same supply offer on
day D + 1, and conversely.
In the absence of system disturbances (e.g., weather
changes) or shocks (e.g., line outages), the dispatch levels
determined on each day D for the day-ahead market for day
D + 1 are carried out as planned without need for settlement
of differences in the real-time market.
B. The GridLAB-D Platform
GridLAB-D [6] is an open-source software platform devel-
oped by the U.S. Department of Energy at Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL). It is designed for the study of
5In the current released version (V2.05) of AMES, LSEs have no learning
capabilities; LSE demand bids are user-specified at the beginning of each
simulation run. However, as explained more carefully in [19], AMES includes
a general learning module, JReLM, that can be used to implement a wide
variety of stochastic reinforcement learning methods for cognitive agents.
Extension to include LSE learning is planned for future AMES releases.
6This learning is implemented via the JReLM learning module; see foot-
note 5.
power distribution systems composed of retail customers with
power loads arising from a variety of modeled appliances and
equipment. Its core operating principles are its open-source
architecture and its integration and interoperability with other
software, such as AMES.
GridLAB-D currently has the functionality to simulate and
solve AC power flow using three flow solvers (Gauss-Seidel,
Kersting’s method, and Newton-Raphson), which are selected
depending on the circumstances and the modeler’s preferences.
Weather patterns from historical data [21] gathered by the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) are used to
create random but realistic weather patterns from various
regions throughout the United States.
Houses modeled within the simulation have their own ther-
mal characteristics and will heat, cool, and operate appliances
according to weather conditions and the household’s economic
constraints. GridLAB-D is bundled with a plethora of load
models including clothes washers and driers, water heaters,
electric vehicle chargers, lights, and others.
The ability of GridLAB-D to model distribution systems
arising from realistic load models unlocks the ability to do
countless possible studies regarding distribution equipment,
lines, and transformers. One such possibility is calculating the
loss-of-life effects on transformers due to loads arising from
electric vehicle chargers, as mentioned in [22]. Looking at
these factors can allow a more complete view of the economic
impacts of various retail market pricing mechanisms.
C. Retail and Wholesale Market Seaming
In the current version of AMES, the LSE is the sole inter-
mediary between the wholesale power market and downstream
retail demand. On each day D the LSE forecasts its electric
energy needs for each hour H of day D +1 and then submits
a 24-hour demand bid to the ISO for the day-ahead market on
day D + 1 in an attempt to secure sufficient electric energy
to meet these forecasted electric energy needs. Consequently,
the LSE is the lynch pin for the proposed seaming of AMES
with GridLAB-D at the market level.
In this project we intend to investigate three types of
contracts for retail customers: FP, TOU, and RTP. Under an FP
contract, the LSE promises to service its customers’ electric
energy demands at a flat rate p, regardless of the wholesale
electric energy price. Under a TOU contract, the LSE promises
to service its customer’s electric energy demands at a rate
dependent only on time of use. Consequently, for any given
hour, retail demands arising under either FP or TOU contracts
translate into a fixed (price insensitive) demand for the LSE
at wholesale for that hour.
On the other hand, under an RTP contract, a consumer’s
electric energy demand varies inversely with the wholesale
electric energy price. Consequently, for any given hour, retail
demands arising under RTP contracts translate into a price-
sensitive demand function for the LSE at wholesale for that
hour.
Fig. 5 illustrates the hourly wholesale demand bid of an
LSE that services its retail customers under FP, TOU, and RTP
contracts. The fixed demand under its FP and TOU contracts
7Fig. 5. Illustration of an hourly wholesale demand bid for an LSE with retail
customers serviced under FP, TOU, and RTP contracts
is denoted by b, whereas the price-sensitive demand under its
RTP contracts is denoted by the dashed curve. The solid curve
then represents the overall demand bid that the LSE submits
to the ISO. A change in the portfolio of FP, TOU, and RTP
contracts held by an LSE’s retail consumers translates into a
change in the shape of this solid curve.
As noted in Section IV-A, AMES already models hourly
LSE demand bids as consisting of fixed and price-sensitive
parts. Consequently, contract choice involving FP, TOU, and
RTP contracts should be relatively easy to implement without
extensive additional coding.
D. Transmission and Distribution Network Seaming
Currently we are envisioning seaming AMES and
GridLAB-D via co-simulation as shown in Fig. 6. AMES will
be used to simulate GenCos, LSEs, and an ISO engaging in a
wholesale power market operating over a high-voltage (HV)
transmission network. GridLAB-D will be used to simulate
a TDU managing a lower-voltage (LV) distribution network
servicing a region of retail consumers.
Seaming at the level of the two networks involves two
key entities: the TDU, who reports data to the ISO for load
forecasting and other purposes; and the distribution substation
which steps down power from the HV transmission grid to
the LV distribution grid for ultimate distribution to retail
consumers.
AMES will resolve the HV transmission system and settle-
ments in the real-time market with a timestep of ΔTA on the
order of 5 minutes. Concurrently, GridLAB-D will simulate
the thermal and electrical status of the distribution network
with a timestep of ΔTG on the order of 1 second.
The two test beds will communicate every ΔTC , on the
order of 5 minutes. GridLAB-D will share with AMES actual
load data arising from the retail consumers serviced by the
distribution network, and AMES will share with GridLAB-
D updated price and settlement information as needed to
implement contractual arrangements between the LSEs and
retail consumers. Each day, ΔTD, GridLAB-D will share
the weather forecast with AMES and AMES will share with
GridLAB-D updated LSE contract information.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Modern power systems are extraordinarily complex, in-
volving trade networks operating over physical transmission
networks at both the wholesale and retail customer levels.
Fortunately, spectacular advances in computational power are
increasing our ability to study the performance of such sys-
tems, taking into account both the power engineer’s concern
with network reliability and the economist’s concern with
market efficiency.
One such advance is agent-based modeling (ABM), the
representation and study of interactive processes as dynamic
systems of interacting agents. Based on object-oriented pro-
gramming concepts, ABM is a “culture dish” modeling ap-
proach that can accommodate a variety of real-world structural
conditions, institutional constraints, and behavioral modes with
relative ease. Starting from initial conditions specified by the
modeler, all subsequent system events are driven solely by
agent interactions. Those interactions are determined dynam-
ically in run-time by the internal structures, informational
states, beliefs, motivations, and data-processing methods of
cognitive agents as channeled and constrained by their external
environments.
This study summarizes proposed work on a challenging
project involving the integrated study of retail and wholesale
power system operation with smart-grid functionality. Our
particular concern is pre-testing the reliability and efficiency
implications of introducing advanced metering and contracting
capabilities for retail customers.
Our project is innovative in three key regards. First, the
project team has extensive professional expertise in power
engineering, economics, and ABM test bed development.
Second, each team member is committed to the goal of
transforming the study of power system operations through
the development of open-source, extensible, micro-validated
ABM test beds. Third, to our knowledge, no prior research
has focused on enabling the open-source pre-testing of smart
grid functionality for integrated retail/wholesale power system
operations through controlled ABM test-bed experiments.
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